7'1i;it t l i c w specul;itions should l~econic tlic favourite prirsriits ;ind the f;ishional)lc topics of such a pcriotl is c~strcnic~ly n;itiir;il. \ \ 'e look Ixick on tlw snvnpc condition of o i i r ;incc,slors with tlic tririiiiph of sripcriority.
\\J;irton's Prcafacc not only reflects tliv smugness of ; i n ;igc poiid of its intellectual ncliie\wnents mid of thc triumph of rcwpn ovcr tlic ideological fanaticism of tlic, rcligious wars; it nlso irradiates the conviction that thcx ciiri'e of imin's progress from \vliat Rabelais called "the, long dark night of the middle agcls" takes tlie sliapv of a continuously nscewling spiral.
Tlic rirlxinc. Oxonian divine could scnrccily foresee that tlic ninc~teenth and twcmticxtli centurics would see ;I rc\wsioii I~ack from civility to barbarism marked on ;I grand or imss scale by the organized butchery of \\'orld \\':ir I. tlic, gcmocide, s l n \~ la1)or and death camps of IVorltl 11, tlic incinerntion of Hiroshimu m d N;ig;is:iki, ;ind more rclccntly. tlic shndo\v of tlii~riiioniiclc~ir aniiiliilation which hangs ovcr tlic world. The ;igc' of the Enlightenincnt wisely regardcd fora. 21s the last argument of kings. By contrast, in the words of Theodore Rosznk, the herald of today's youthful countc,r-culture, ours is "a civilization sunk i n : i n unsliakiible coinmitnicnt to genocide, gambling niadly with the universal cJxterinination of our species." As Ib~szak observes. thr truly criminal element i n this inass folly is tlie extent to which the techiiocrury insists "in tlie nanic of progress, in thc name of rc;isoii, that tlic unthinkable becomes thinkable ancl t l i c~ intolernble becomes tolcrable."
Paul Blarlistocli, an intelligence arid rescarrli spc~cial-ist. is ; I nir1111)cr of tlie Department of Interiiatiorial Studies. University of Soutli Carolina. Aiiiotig his p~~l)lications are Mustcm of Dvcoit and Tlit Sccrcit Road 10 K'orld R'ar 11.
Tlic. unthinkable has become :hinkable and the intolcrkible has become tolerablc not only for the technocratic society a s a whole but also for the majority of pri\.ate indi\.iduals, whose critical sc"w has becm stuntcd or flattened bp the i1fAtience surrounding tliem, until they fit tlie dcwription of llarcuse's onedimensionnl man. For exaniplc~, after tlie acquaintance and urgently asked to meet him discreetly in a small bar. By the time his friend arrived the Captain, who had already been drinking, took him aside and asked for his candid advice. His unit had just captured and identified n well-known native terrorist who refused to talk on bring interrogated. The prisoner was reportedly responsible for a number of previous bombings. Othcr sourccs, believed reliable, stated that the terrorist had alreidy planted a time bomb which would blow up by noon the next day, probably killing some French military personnel and wounding others. The Captain was obviously deeply disturbed. A devout Catholic and a decent humiln being, he was opposed to the use of torture (which might even result in the death of the prisoner), and yet the lives of his comrndcs were at stake. They would be seriously jeopardized unlcss the information nccded to defuse the bomb could somehow be elicited from the prisoncr, who stubbornly refused to respond to even the most grueling interrogation. Time was ruinning out. Should hc order torturc to be used? And .if hc did, how could lie live with . I himself later? His friend replicd to the effect that 1ic was neither the Captain's conseiencr nor his analyst, and thilt no one, not c "~i Solomon himself, could make the decision for him. The Captain ordercad thc use of torture and the l~omb w;is successfully nrutralized. The terrorist dicd from the effects of the torturc and the next day the Captain committed suicide. e This situation, which for purposes of discussion may be called "the Captain's dilemma," recurs so frequently, especially in guerrilla warfarcx, that doubtless several variations of this story, some true, some apocryphal, are familiar to the reader. Even if many such tales are apocryphal, thc sc>riously damaging effects of torture on both the victim and the pritctitioner (the actor and the object) ;ire real ancl incscapable. \Vhat is t r w of torture also applies to other forms of 
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French public protest against the moral poison slircnd b y the use of torture and related prisoner interrogation mcthods began in 1958, but did not reach serious proportions until four years later, in 1962. American protests against similar techniques used by U.S. forces in Vietnam have been delayed by se\,erill factors: first, the initial shock effect and dishclicf in the redity of such incidents as the inassacres at Aly Lai, which were of a much greater order of iiiagnitude . i d niorc spectacular than the torture and killing of isolutcd prisoners. A secotitl consitferntion is the fact that for years the U.S. troops served in \'ietn:m ;IS "advisors" m d thus left most of thc, "dirty work" to the South \'ietnamesc. Selective or exemplary vssassin;ition (of village leaders, for esample ), torture and otlicr atrociticss were ascribed solely to "the cnemy" or dismisscd ;is normal practices of "Orientals" conteniptuously dismissed I S "gooks."
It is probably true that tlie level of cruelty practiced on cadi other by warring states or factions in Soutlwast Asia is ruuch higher thun in the Western E:Uropwi tliclatvr of operations during World IVar 11. This i n no way justifies the fact that American "ndvisors" l i ; i \~ condoned cruel and inhuman priicticc,s which they \vel1 knew werv in direct violation of tlie geiicdly acccptcd Rules of L m d \\';irfare. The c w x~s e most frcqwntly offcwd has been that gucxrrilla or revolutionary warfnrc, ;is practiced h y hoth sides in \'ictnani, is ''a different kind of war," oiic iii which the traditional rules ;ire no longer appliciihle. The f;imilinr hard-line :ipology that "the enemy stxted the practice" is inadmissiblc w e n if true, since to accept it 111eiins to reduce, standards to the 1cvc.l of cruclty and Imitality practiced by the worst sadists on the fic~ld of battle. In civil lifc, anyone who insistcd that standmls of conduct should he sct by morn1 dc~gcncrates would he regarded as unbalanced. ;uid would prolxibly br in need of n kerpcr. However, iri tlic fic1ld, in the hcat of battle, the argument that "nice guys finish last" frequently wins the day. As Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber observes in his memoir, Lietctenunt in Algeria, "Fundamentally, the 'Stalinists' in Algeria and elsewhere have everything in their favor: it is so much easier, on both sides, to be totalitarian, to respond with total obedience to instinct, distrust, racialism."
The concept of a law of nations which includes rules designed to make the conduct of warfare less cruel and barbarous has taken root slowly over the last three or four centuries. General acceptance of the rule of law is rightly regarded as a major step forward i n the history of Western civilization. For the U.S. to scrap this achievement, even for the sake of an elusive "victory" in the rice paddies of Southeast Asia, would be the height of unreason and folly. Thc opposite approach, known as Sclirecklichkeit-the concept that, by assuring victory, brutality and terror will reduce the overall cost-has been tried and found wanting in two world wars. The shock effects of brutality are quickly dissipated. Terror begets terror and soon proves counterproductive for both sides. In recent times the greatest advocate of Schreckliclikeit was Adolf Hitler, who spelled out the concept in a bloodthirsty speech to his commanding gencrals at Obersalzberg on August 22, 1939, a few hours before the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact which Only in such a w;iy will we win the vital space that we need. \\'\io still talks now;itlays of the estermination of thv A r iii c n i ;in s?
Appalled by such candor, we may miss the point that, judged in moral terms, a few leading figures in thr U.S. military or government establishment have sunk to Hitler's level by thinly disguised calls for the thermonuclear annihilation of the. enemy if "victory" appears to be unobtainablc through the use of conventional wc.npons. Such appeals pro\-c that the totalitarian states h i i w nm.er had it monopoly on mord pygniies.
A third factor which has confuscd the moral issues involved in American operations in Vietnam is the, so-callcd Green Bcwt affair, which received worldwide publicity in the late summer and fall of 1969, lwfore the hly Lai incident became a cmse c&li.bre.
Thc details hiiw been Iiushed up and the case offi-cially closed, but apparently a native Vietnamese agent, eniploycd b y ;~n Americnn Spccinl Forces intelligence unit, was found to liilvc b w n turned into a double agent by the Wet Cong. (According to several sources, hc. hud liven photographcd dealing with tlie encmy.) After invcstigation and interrog'ition (which includrd tlic use of drugs), thc Vietnanlese w w "cxecutcd" by the Specid Forccs unit with the knowledgc and/or approval of local Central Intelligence Agency officials. Thc cntire operation should Iia\.e remained sccret, but w i s drlibrratcly leak'ed to the press by the thratcsr conimandcr, Gcnera1 Creigliton AbriiIiis. Thi\ original leak of classified information was in itself a gross security \iolation. It was followed by others a s scnsatioiial dct '11 '1 s \vc'rc' released in such a way iis to blacken the rqmtation of an elite, highly specialized service forcc and to create an image of the Special Forces iis "nicrcenarie~ of the C.I.A." No one who hns not witnessed thc intense rivalry between regular army ancl SpcJcial Forccs units in Vietnam can really apprecintc its intensity. Most regular army officers ha\^ becm committed to the esacalating use of massive force against the enciii). guerrillas. They repeatedly rejected tlie warnings of such experts as Bernard Fall against tlie folly of trying to solve counterinsurgency problems, which arc' cssentially political, with the use of iiitissi\,e conventional forces. Many of the top U.S. commanders whose experiences date from Korea or even IVorld IVar I1 are still reluctant to withdraw conventional forces from Vietnam, even when ordrred to do so h y thc Nixon Administration. As the painful reccssional got under way, the temptation to strike a low blow a t the elite Special Forces by means of ii lurid "Grccn Bcret murder mystery" was apparently irresistible. e In covering the c'ise, the news incdia have focused attention on assassination as if i t had suddenly bccm discovered by tlie U.S. Special Forccs in Vietnam. The implication is grossly misleading. In \7ic.tnani over the last clecadc the Viet Cong, not tlie US. Spe- cial Forces, h a w specialized in kidnapping, terror ancl the conspicuous or exemplary murdcr of suspc.ctcd enemy agents and "collaborators." Reliable figures beginning in 1960 indicate that the \'id Cong l i ; i \~ executed roughly 700 kidnappings :incl twicc. that numbcr of assnssinations as ;I ycxarly werage. Local government officials, village leaders and c\wi school teachers have heen prime targets. No figures arc a \ ,tilable, of course, but fairly reliable reports indiciite that the occasional use of selective counter-tcsrror by ' American-controlled "Special Reconnaissance Units" has been on a much loivcr scale. This "invidious coni- ~~o~iimandcr-in-Chicf, General Blnskovitz. resigned in protest against the atrocities committed by the SS :itid Srcrrt I'olicc, "Action Groups" over which hc> had no c4frictivc control under the Nazi xhinistrative sctup. Adniird Canaris, the h c d of German military int(~lIigc~ncc~, tlw A/iicc/ir, secrctly but firmly refused to c w r ) . out dircxt orders from Hitler to assassinate the French Cencnls. I\'cyg:and :ind Ciraud. This does not n i~~~i n tliLit tliv A b i c d i r nbstained from executing con\fictcd ~douldc ;)gents under field conditions conilxirable to those in thr scmsationally exploited Grcen I3crc.t "niurder" c~ise. Such executions are universally rcicognized ;is Stmdard Opc~rating Procedure for such iigcwic~s ;is thr Specinl Forces intelligence units. I-IowcJvctr, the torture of prisoners so widely tolerated in thc Southeast Asian tlienter is in direct violation of both the spirit and letter of thr law. To their undying moral credit the Germans still pursue ancl prosecute war criminals \vho stained thc honor of the Gcmnan Arm?' in iVorlc1 \Var 11. After fighting ii moral crusade a p i n s t I-Iitlcr and his SS legions, tlici least the U.S. ( tcorldoicto, February, 1970) . Dr.
Lefever is a noted scholar, and his point on the contradiction between sccurity-isolation and reforniintervention is well taken. But the basic thrust of the article ought not go undiscussed, for it seems to advocate the same contradiction in reverse: securityintervention and reform-isolation. And that is equally bad policy.
What Dr. Lefever appears to say is that any attempt to stimulate basic political reform abroad by means of foreign policy is not only a violation of Article 27 of the U.N. Charter (domestic jurisdiction ), but both morally arrogant and politically unwise. He priiises the "political sense and moral wisdom" of Vattel, who held that no sovereign state may inquire into, judge, or attempt to influence the mnnner in which another sovereign rules. At most, says Lefever, a state may encourage development in another state as a secondary end of its policy, but niay never pressure another regime to effect internal political or social reform. Such a superficially virtuous "reform-isoliltion" ( I would prefer to cnll it "moral isolationism") may h n~~ been a \~ialilc~ option for the absolutist princes of ~~~l f -c~~i t i l i~i e d states in cightecnth century Europe, hut it is unrcnlistic and outmoded today (though still attracti\dy utopian in its legalistic simplicity ) . Ours is. iiftcr all, ;in incredibly complex world: public opinion has n c \ w been more influential on foreign policy; it is \'cry difficult to draw n hard line behveen foreign and domestic issues; and rising expectations of justice, cqxwsed in trnnsnational ideologies, racial iiio\wiients, rwolutionary forces, and even cultural nnd religious doctrines-id1 heil\rily laden with moral content-have never had freer rein nor enjoyed higher political potency in world affairs. In short, it is ;i truism today to slmik of the policy relevance of international social forces : Columbia University lins hiid n professor of same for several years now.
Thc doctrine of "moral isolationism" (as I see it) appears to be based upon the following premises:
1. That "the highest piirpose of forcign policy is security and peace," whilc "the highest purpose of domestic policy is justice." (One winccs at the dichotomy, since both policies continually intersect, and
